Greg Detre
25/2/00
nomology � the science of law + law-making
science � the formulation of laws explaining natural phenomena
see BPhil stuff
when he says of mental events that don't cause physical events that �the argument will not touch them�, does he mean that they pose no problem or that he won't broach them in the argument?
does it matter that he ignores processes, states and attributes?
can you not have a frame test for physical prediates: �x is a physical predicate using only physical vocabulary�???
but isn't that just begging the question???
he�s not discussing the explanation of the mechanisms of the physical giving rise to the mental(/subjective) but the issues of causation
why is free will only a special case � what other cases are there?
autonomy vs anomaly = having your own rules rather than obeying no rules (whatsoever)
entails
he�s saying that we can identify the menatl with the physical without psychophysical laws (i.e. explanation of �how�)
what is meant by �psychological verbs as used when they create apparently non-extensional contexts�
are raw feels and sense data mental or not, then?
with the Jones/stellar example, are they the same event just because they�re at the same time?
he�s saying that even if they are classed a single, mental event, that�s ok, because it just means the mental definition is too wide, which is ok; just so long as it�s not too narrow
re Taylor: i.e. accompaniment of individuals = identity, accompaniment of kinds = correlative laws being applied
mental and physical identity � some extension, different intension
in the L/L� discussion, what is meant by: �no purely physical prediate has the same extension as a mental predicate�?
ah yes, physical and mental predicates can have the same sentences extensionally, but the predicates themselves won�t have the same extension, i.e. the sentence will have different intension, right?
single event has same extension, different intension, i.e. can be picked out/described in different ways
laws are linguistic, and so are instantiated as events depending on how the event has been described and so the same event described differently (mental/physical dichotomy) has different relation to law
is this the root cause of all conflicts of principle/law/morality?
�mental� = weird, supervenient description of identical physical event (having same extension), though the mental does not necessarily bear any resemblance, and the nomological causation working on the physical/extensional level has a weird, anomalous perspective when viewed as mental
is he also saying that the causality itself, rather than just the laws, is linguistic?
what�s the difference?
is he saying that there is sometimes causality without law?
what links two events causally if not an instantiation of them as law?
why can/shouldn't there be a physical predicate Px which identifies the mental?
pg 215 2nd half
there may be T gen statements of physical <-> mental, but not laws
what would an objective view of anomalous monism look like � or is that what we�re being given?
what role does God play? how did this metaphysical system come to be?
this is just non-substantive dualism?
aren't all supervenient properties somehow mental?
just as with the anomological character of mental-physical generalisations, even if were to find an open sentence in behavioural terms which is exactly coextensive with a mental predicate, wouldn't be persuaded
how can the mental be both autonomous + supervenient on the physical?
can beauty be autonomous?
nomological statements (i.e. laws?) bring together predicates that we know a priori are made for each other
is the anomality of the mental: lawlessness within the mental, i.e. mental events lawlessly causing each other, or only re psychophysical laws?
in (both length +) belief � coherentist������� homonomic?
feature of physical reality that physical changes can be explained by laws that connect it with other changes and conditions physically described
mental: attribution of mental phenomena must be responsible to the background of reaosns, beliefs and intentions of the individual
each has its proper source of evidence: cannot be tight connections
the translation from mental to physical is warped + indeterminate, hence what seem nomological in the physical world don�t appear so in mental terms
2 features of mental events in relation to physical:
causal dependence and nomological independence
� dissolve the paradox of the efficacy of thought and purpose in the material world + their freedom of law
mental events as a class cannot be explained by physical science
particular mental events can when with we know particular identities
Kant: �think of man in a different sense + relation when we call him free and when we regard him as subject to the laws of nature � need to show \ not only that they both co-exist but that they�re necessarily united in the same subject�
analyticity???
reasons = causal explanation for action
vs Wittgenstein: causal explanation = reference to law-like regularity
(actions)/events as being describable in >1 way, both intentional/rational explanation without reference to laws but with referece to alrger parttern of rational behaviour�������� is distinct/independent of explanation by reference to causes
primary reason � belief + desire (pro-attitude)
reason for the action � the cause of the action
in rational terms, there is no strict law for this connection
in causal terms, there is a law-like regularity, non-describable in terms of rationality
thus: rational explanation need not involve explicit reference to any law-like regularity
while nevertheless: there must be some such regularity that underlies the rational connection just inasmuch as its causal
rational explanations cannot be formulated in terms of a predictve science
so denying that there can be any reduction of rational to non-rational explanation
does it make sense to talk about events really as instants, then to talk of them being causally related?
perhaps there�s a causal process underlying/running through them though
does this affect the argument from laws as linguistic entities?
how can you explain causality without reference tos trict laws? ah, only under certain descriptions (of the related events) � does that solve the problem? does it allow that those two events are causally related by a strict law if described differently somehow?
again, it�s all about the indirect mapping from the mental � to physical�
any mental event is identical with some physical event: = one and the same event under two descriptions
but there will not be a law relating them directly/strictly
no strict law relating wanting to read with brain activity?
so what is the brain activity? just that
normative considerations of overall consistency + coherence constrain our own thinking about events as physically described
but they have no purchase as physical events as such
there are correlations, just not strict (precise, explicit, exceptionless) laws needed to reduce mental to physical descriptions
mental supervenes on the physical � every mental event can be paired with (and by implication, depends on) a physical event
suprevenes definition: predicate p supervenes on a set of predicates S iff p does not distinguish any entities that cannot be distinguished by S
what about inseparability of p from S???)
events that cannot be distinguished under some physical description cannot be distinguished under a mental description either
anomalous monism = attractive, but contentious on both sides
[was it Cottingham/Descartes who thought that that was the sign of a well-balanced theory???]
nomological conception of causality � no real argument
Davidsonian supervenience: incompatible with other aspects
anomalous monism: makes the mental causally inert
mental reasons = only (post-rationalisation)������ (not instigation)
if the mental ≈ the physical but oddly-translated, then how do we know that our mental actions are accurately translated into physical ones?
it�s like seeing the whole world thought a lens like a fairground mirror � could that be said to �accurately� translate our actions in the real/physical world?
are we just �thinking� that we�re instigating actions, but those thoughts themselves are just the distorted (in a way we can't every know) alter egos of a strict physical process of causation?
could it be that mental events are deterministic in chaotic/complex terms
can randomness be a law? no, for the same reason that divine intervention can't be?
cf miracles + natural
what is a law? cf PQ and SQ
predictive, explanatory power, quantifiable, relies on/product of
can you have Anomalism of the Mental as uncaused causes feeding into a nomological physical system and also being effects of it?
not that I can see � at least, only occasionally
Anomalism of the Mental doesn't require either that its causes be anomalous/uncaused, does it?� ������ Cartesiani or logical extension???
it�s non-extensionality rather than intentionality that it�s testing (pg 211)
are they the same?
can events be pinpointed in universal time?
how can a stellar collision happening at the same time as a mental event class it too as a mental event?
can 2 events happen at exactly the same time?
is the traditional argument for identity theory of the mental and physical then a Humean one of continued connectoin being inducted to nomological causation?
discussion of �given mental events� vs kinds of events (pg 212)
identities without correlating laws?
identities vs associated correlation vs extension (pg 213)
can neural events be of varying complexity � does it make sense to speak of one particular combination of neuronal firings as being > complex than another � though some thoughts �feel� more complex/describable/comprehensible/rememberable?
ok, so all mental events are describable in physical/neural terms, but not all physical events have a mental side � so what?
if mental characteristics are supervenient on physical characteristics, then you can't have zombies, right?
supervenience >�/span> reduce moral properties to descriptive
eh?������ reduce T in formal system � syntactical properties
distinction made in his definition of the nomological character of causality (pg 215)
why is monism necessarily physical? or is it just htat it makes no sense to draw the distinction?
if mental phenomena cannot be given purely physical explanations, then doesn't that make them distinct?
just because they happen at the same time, doesn't make them identical
this is like SQs not being explained in purely PQ terms
can force or emergent properties be explained in purely physical terms though, for instance?
is he saying that an event is an event, it will necessary have a physical aspect, but may not have a corresponding mental one?
�tedium of a lengthy + uninstructive alternation� to const Px without a background of consistency, error is meaningless (pg 215)
hence the LD + MLD/mass confusion shatters the propositional framework within which each individual proposition has its meaning/content
coherent pattern in the actions + attitudes: without, forego personalised
can there be a �categorical� difference between the mental and physical and still be monism? (pg 223)
heteronom/� vs vindicatory?
---
nomological � stating or relating to a non-logical necessarity or law of nature
difference between nomological and universal statement is that from the universal �all As are Bs� one cannot, but from the nomological �all As must be Bs� one can, infer the counterafctual �if this were an A it would (have to) be a B�
psychophysics � the branch of psychology concerned with the relationship between physical stimuli and the effects they produce in the organism
supervenient (of a property) � inseparable from other properties of something
2 objects may be identical except that one is red and the other not, but they cannot be identical except that one is beautiful and the other not; beauty is thus a supervenient property
God as the restraint-giver � that�s where the value comes from in Christianity � the Ten Commandments
don't you need to specify a goal/criterion/scoring system measure, e.g. the Good/Happiness/doing God�s will as well?
an absolute conception of reality gives us none of these:
which is BW�s point about intelligibility and informativeness of it
can evolution provide these and thus be generative?
can a computer program ever be/have mental?
leave ethics till last, because what I�d really like to do is be able to just flesh it out as the direct result of a generative metaphysical system developed this year cha! i spose BW would deem this taks hopeless because no metaphysical system can be both absolute + ethically generative
none
though causal connection between action + reason is bidirectional, the rational connection is one-way, isn't it?
how can there be a connection between (2 ways of expressing) the same event?
is it that mental and physical are two different ways of describing one and the same thing, but there is indeterminacy of translation between them???
does that then meanthat the translation of strict laws to the mental just gives the �lilusion� of mental anomalism
well, no, it is anomalism ocs� when you stay within the mental description there are no strict laws